Wednesday, 6 January 2016

PATHANKOT TERRORIST ATTACK -- WHY WHY WHY ????






January 1 Early morning (around 3 am): SP Salwinder Singh and his cook Madan Gopal alert local police about terrorists who abducted them. What was the SP doing at that point  and at that time in an official vehicle? Why did the terrorists not kill him?

Even so why their claims were not given credence by his brethren  for hours; crucial time was lost. WHY?

The cell tower (BTS) was the same for all the calls made by the terrorists to their handlers in Pakistan, from the mobile phone of Verma, a jeweller and a friend of the police officer whose vehicle was hijacked in the afternoon of 01 January and barely hours before launching the attack, were same. The calls made from the phone of Verma were routed through the same mobile phone tower throughout January 1 and the intervening night before the attack was launched. Why this information was not used to finalize location of the terrorists and Army deployed in that area for cordon, search and destroy . Why Why Why ?

Afternoon: Centre issues alert about terrorists; by now more or less certain their location was Pathankot.


NSA convenes meeting with senior officials; NSG dispatched to Pathankot who reached late in the evening of 1 Jan. Precious time lost.

Why no detailed combing of the region done, despite several military units with a manpower of nearly 50,000 troops all trained and experienced in counter insurgency and terrorist warfare stationed next door, not deployed at Air Base Immediately? Colossal stupidity on part of NSA to send NSG who are not trained in counter insurgency and area counter terrorist operations, lead to death of a Lt Col by an exploding grenade booby trapped under body of slain terrorist.

The National Security Guard (NSG) was set up in 1984 as a Federal Contingency Deployment Force to tackle all facets of terrorism in the country. As a specialized counter terrorism force, it is intended for use "only in exceptional situations" and not meant to take over the "functions of the Military, State Police Forces or other Para Military Forces". Yet, over the years its role has vastly expanded to provide personal security to influential politicians quite independent of the real threat that they face. Many politicians seek personal security details for themselves and their family for reasons of ego, prestige, and power projection with their black Cat Commando security details. Had the command of the NSG rested with the Army this nonsense would not have occurred.

The National Security Guard who were deployed in Pathankot are trained  to conduct counter terrorist task  including counter hijacking tasks on land, sea, and air; Bomb disposal (search, detection and neutralization of IEDs); PBI (Post Blast Investigation) and Hostage Rescue missions, aggressive intervention and aircraft hijack scenarios. They are not meant to protect any asset, human or otherwise. Their role is to terminate a situation through direct intervention." The NSG could have been kept on standby for any eventuality and not given charge of an operation the likes of which are being waged by the Army in Kashmir. How did Mr. NSA expect 160 NSG personnel and 60 Army troops to comb, engage terrorists and guard Air Force assets in an area of more than 1500 acres? Did Mr. NSA think the terrorists were going to advertise "LOOK Mr. NSA WE ARE LOCATED HERE COME AND GET US?" Mr NSA how did six terrorists kill seven Indian soldiers and injure 20 after managing to infiltrate an airbase which was apparently as per you and your planning fully ready to fight them? Why Why Why Mr. NSA?


Why the overall command of the operation did not wrest with the Army since there has never been a case where command of an active operation has been transferred from the Army to the National Security Guard, an elite police force under the Home Ministry. In this case, the NSG was given the lead role after two columns (60 men) of the Army had already been deployed in Pathankot in anticipation of an impending attack on the airbase. "Command of an operation is transferred to the Army once they are called for an anti-terrorism operation and, in this case, defense of an airfield operation." Why was it not done? Or rather it was taken back from a Brigade Commander and transferred to the IG Ops NSG? Why Why Why ?


What's more, the single Special Forces squad of the Indian Army, trained specifically to fight terrorists, and brought into the airbase from Pathankot cantonment before the attack began never directly engaged the terrorists in the fire-fight and instead stood guard of the "strategic assets" at the base- fighters, helicopters, surface to air missiles or radar facilities.  This is the result of transfer of Command midway as well as trying to keep command of ops on ground by our Mr NSA. Why?

A full battalion  of the Army's prestigious 1 Para Special Forces Regiment is based in Nahan less than 30 minutes' flying time from Pathankot and could have been deployed at short notice if required.  Why was it not done and time wasted till some NSG arrived late in the evening. This deployment of 1 Para Commando immediately would have saved a lot of grief. Obviously it would have meant transferring Command and Control of operations from the Home Ministry to the Army with immediate effect. Obviously Empire building was going on by the NSA as well as the Home Ministry. How many brownie points were scored by putting National Security on the Anvil Mr NSA?

Why was Command of the Operation shifted to IG NSG in the middle of an operation? So also why was there a need in the middle of an Army Cantonment to call the NSG in the first place?  
Why was there a full-fledged disagreement between an Army Brigadier (One of the Local Brigade Commanders) commanding operations till then, and the Inspector General Operations of the National Security Guard, an Army Major General on deputation, who flew in from Delhi, on the orders of the Home Ministry.

The situation became more confusing when the Air Officer Commanding, Western Air Command, was asked to fly to Pathankot to take key decisions in the conduct of the ongoing encounter prompting another disagreement, this time between the Air Force and the National Security Guard. The lack of cooperation and coordination between the different agencies was blistering. Why Why Why ???? Mr. NSA why?

Ultimately, the Army Brigadier stood down since he was junior to the NSG's IG (Operations), who has the rank of Major General. The National Security Guard ultimately retained overall control of the remainder of the operation though the Air Officer Commanding, an Air Marshal, remained on the airbase. This Mr NSA, policeman,  spy, led to a totally botched up operation which has  never happened in the last 3 decades. Why Why Why was a an ex policeman given overall Command of an anti terrorist operation ?

the NSG has had 28 DGs, in 31 years, with an average tenure of one year and a few months. Many have served as DG just for a few months, while waiting for promotion or a more desirable post, (In effect means this post is not desirable to them).  None of the DGs of NSG has had experience of commanding NSG Special Actions Groups, or any other Special Forces command experience . All the selected DGs have been officers from Indian Police Service (IPS). As per the government policy, NSG is to be headed by an Officer from IPS. Since the Combat Units under the NSG, which conduct counter terror operations are commanded by the Army Officers, this effectively negates the possibility of any officer with field experience in counter terror operations heading the organization as its DG at a later stage. Why this policy has not changed with earlier negative experience of a policeman heading the NSG and an Army Officer not heading the NSG.

Early morning (3.30 am): Terrorists spotted; Centre claims they were contained in forested area

Evening: Four terrorists killed; Home Minister claims operations over

Who briefed Home Minister, and why was haste shown in declaring operation a success?

Even the Prime Minister declared operations were over.

January 3 (Sunday)
Morning (10 am): NSG's Lt Col Niranjan killed, five others injured while inspecting a terrorist's body.
Why was no protocol in place to avoid such casualties? Obviously the NSG Commandoes were not trained to handle dead terrorist bodies. The body of the terrorist was booby trapped by his accomplice after his death. It is learnt that a grenade with safety pin removed was kept under his body as soon as the body was moved the lever flew out detonating the grenade and Killing the colonel, though he was a bomb disposal expert not trained to deal with terrorists. An army man from a nearby Army Unit would not have probably made this mistake. However Mr. NSA did not find it necessary to hand over Command to the local Army Commander with over 50,000 well trained and Anti Terrorist and counter insurgency experienced troops under his Command. Why Why Why?

12.20 pm: Firing starts from two different locations, security forces  realize more terrorists are alive
Why was there no careful combing and clearing of the area? Obviously 300 NSG personnel and a column of Army soldiers cannot comb an area of more than 1500 acres. Why was the local units not deployed Mr. NSA why?

All this happened near one of the most heavily guarded international borders in the world. Not in a far away place not used to terror attacks.
Yet, the response was extremely poor and embarrassing.
The Pakistan backed Jaish-e-Mohammed terrorists easily gained access into a vital Indian Air Force Station at Pathankot. They managed to cause the intended damage and instill fear across India.
The inefficient handling of the operation cost us the lives of seven soldiers and also damaged the reputation of our elite security forces.
After Saturday's operations, the Centre even declared that the entire operation was over and all the terrorists have been killed. On Sunday, the firing once again began causing fear and embarrassment at the same time. Two terrorists actually stayed inside the IAF Station undetected the entire Saturday night.
What a national embarrassment!!

After the SP reported that his vehicle was hijacked by suspected terrorists, the police and other agencies should have heightened security across all vital installations near the border. If they had done that, they could have stopped the terrorists outside or at least at the gates of the Pathankot IAF Station. It clearly shows that despite tall claims of "high alert" nothing was actually done on the ground and authorities were actually groping in the dark.

Any well trained and professional military force would definitely have stopped these terrorists at the gate. Provided they were handed over operations to begin with.

Local media reports suggest that the Punjab Police and other security agencies initially refused to take the words of the abducted SP seriously. They wasted a lot of precious time. Even the murder of a taxi driver did not force them to launch a massive manhunt.
These incidents were treated like ordinary crimes and not like a possible terror attack.
Where were the terrorists hiding between the night of January 1 and January 2? What were they doing? We are yet to get the answer to these questions.
It exposes the lapse on part of Punjab Police too. Like most other states, Punjab Police is also highly politicized and morale is also not high.
The NSA and the PMO must explain what went wrong to the nation. Prime Minister Narendra Modi and the Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar must take stock of the situation and order strict action against erring officers. The NSA must be removed immediately and an Army Man must be appointed in his place. No saying what this gentleman will fuck up next.
After watching the botched up Pathankot security operations, the masters of the terrorists in Pakistan must be smiling. This is exactly what they wanted.
The Pathankot incident should be treated like a national embarrassment. There is nothing to claim that India successfully "averted" a major disaster, something like the 26/11 incident of Mumbai.



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