January 1 Early
morning (around 3 am): SP Salwinder Singh and his cook Madan Gopal alert local
police about terrorists who abducted them. What was the SP doing at that
point and at that time in an official vehicle? Why did the terrorists not kill him?
Even so why their
claims were not given credence by his brethren for hours; crucial time was lost. WHY?
The cell tower
(BTS) was the same for all the calls made by the terrorists to their handlers in Pakistan, from the mobile phone of Verma,
a jeweller and a friend of the police officer whose vehicle was hijacked in the
afternoon of 01 January and barely hours before launching the attack, were same.
The calls made from the phone of Verma were routed through the same mobile
phone tower throughout January 1 and the intervening night before the attack
was launched. Why this information was not used to finalize location of the
terrorists and Army deployed in that area for cordon, search and destroy . Why
Why Why ?
Afternoon:
Centre issues alert about terrorists; by now more or less certain their
location was Pathankot.
NSA convenes
meeting with senior officials; NSG dispatched to Pathankot who reached late in
the evening of 1 Jan. Precious time lost.
Why no detailed
combing of the region done, despite several military units with a manpower of
nearly 50,000 troops all trained and experienced in counter insurgency and
terrorist warfare stationed next door, not deployed at Air Base Immediately?
Colossal stupidity on part of NSA to send NSG who are not trained in counter
insurgency and area counter terrorist operations, lead to death of a Lt Col by
an exploding grenade booby trapped under body of slain terrorist.
The National
Security Guard (NSG) was set up in 1984 as a Federal Contingency Deployment
Force to tackle all facets of terrorism in the country. As a specialized
counter terrorism force, it is intended for use "only in exceptional
situations" and not meant to take over the "functions of the
Military, State Police Forces or other Para Military Forces". Yet, over
the years its role has vastly expanded to provide personal security to
influential politicians quite independent of the real threat that they face.
Many politicians seek personal security details for themselves and their family
for reasons of ego, prestige, and power projection with their black Cat
Commando security details. Had the command of the NSG rested with the Army this
nonsense would not have occurred.
The National
Security Guard who were deployed in Pathankot are trained to conduct counter terrorist task including counter hijacking tasks on land,
sea, and air; Bomb disposal (search, detection and neutralization of IEDs); PBI
(Post Blast Investigation) and Hostage Rescue missions, aggressive intervention
and aircraft hijack scenarios. They are not meant to protect any asset, human
or otherwise. Their role is to terminate a situation through direct
intervention." The NSG could have been kept on standby for any eventuality
and not given charge of an operation the likes of which are being waged by the
Army in Kashmir. How did Mr. NSA expect 160 NSG personnel and 60 Army troops to
comb, engage terrorists and guard Air Force assets in an area of more than 1500
acres? Did Mr. NSA think the terrorists were going to advertise "LOOK Mr.
NSA WE ARE LOCATED HERE COME AND GET US?" Mr NSA how did six terrorists
kill seven Indian soldiers and injure 20 after managing to infiltrate an
airbase which was apparently as per you and your planning fully ready to fight
them? Why Why Why Mr. NSA?
Why the overall
command of the operation did not wrest with the Army since there has never been
a case where command of an active operation has been transferred from the Army
to the National Security Guard, an elite police force under the Home Ministry.
In this case, the NSG was given the lead role after two columns (60 men) of the
Army had already been deployed in Pathankot in anticipation of an impending
attack on the airbase. "Command of an operation is transferred to the Army
once they are called for an anti-terrorism operation and, in this case, defense
of an airfield operation." Why was it not done? Or rather it was taken
back from a Brigade Commander and transferred to the IG Ops NSG? Why Why Why ?
What's more,
the single Special Forces squad of the Indian Army, trained specifically to
fight terrorists, and brought into the airbase from Pathankot cantonment before
the attack began never directly engaged the terrorists in the fire-fight and
instead stood guard of the "strategic assets" at the base- fighters,
helicopters, surface to air missiles or radar facilities. This is the
result of transfer of Command midway as well as trying to keep command of ops
on ground by our Mr NSA. Why?
A full battalion of the Army's prestigious 1 Para Special Forces Regiment is based in Nahan less than 30 minutes' flying time from Pathankot and could have been deployed at short notice if required. Why was it not done and time wasted till some NSG arrived late in the evening. This deployment of 1 Para Commando immediately would have saved a lot of grief. Obviously it would have meant transferring Command and Control of operations from the Home Ministry to the Army with immediate effect. Obviously Empire building was going on by the NSA as well as the Home Ministry. How many brownie points were scored by putting National Security on the Anvil Mr NSA?
A full battalion of the Army's prestigious 1 Para Special Forces Regiment is based in Nahan less than 30 minutes' flying time from Pathankot and could have been deployed at short notice if required. Why was it not done and time wasted till some NSG arrived late in the evening. This deployment of 1 Para Commando immediately would have saved a lot of grief. Obviously it would have meant transferring Command and Control of operations from the Home Ministry to the Army with immediate effect. Obviously Empire building was going on by the NSA as well as the Home Ministry. How many brownie points were scored by putting National Security on the Anvil Mr NSA?
Why was Command
of the Operation shifted to IG NSG in the middle of an operation? So also why
was there a need in the middle of an Army Cantonment to call the NSG in the
first place?
Why was there a
full-fledged disagreement between an Army Brigadier (One of the Local Brigade
Commanders) commanding operations till then, and the Inspector General Operations
of the National Security Guard, an Army Major General on deputation, who flew
in from Delhi, on the orders of the Home Ministry.
The situation
became more confusing when the Air Officer Commanding, Western Air Command, was
asked to fly to Pathankot to take key decisions in the conduct of the ongoing
encounter prompting another disagreement, this time between the Air Force and
the National Security Guard. The lack of cooperation and coordination between
the different agencies was blistering. Why Why Why ???? Mr. NSA why?
Ultimately, the
Army Brigadier stood down since he was junior to the NSG's IG (Operations), who
has the rank of Major General. The National Security Guard ultimately retained
overall control of the remainder of the operation though the Air Officer
Commanding, an Air Marshal, remained on the airbase. This Mr NSA, policeman, spy, led to a totally botched up operation
which has never happened in the last 3
decades. Why Why Why was a an ex policeman given overall Command of an anti
terrorist operation ?
the NSG has had 28 DGs, in 31 years, with
an average tenure of one year and a few months. Many have served as DG just for
a few months, while waiting for promotion or a more desirable post, (In effect
means this post is not desirable to them). None of the DGs of NSG has had experience of
commanding NSG Special Actions Groups, or any other Special Forces command
experience . All the selected DGs have been officers from Indian Police Service
(IPS). As per the government policy, NSG is to be headed by an Officer from
IPS. Since the Combat Units under the NSG, which conduct counter terror
operations are commanded by the Army Officers, this effectively negates the
possibility of any officer with field experience in counter terror operations
heading the organization as its DG at a later stage. Why this policy has not
changed with earlier negative experience of a policeman heading the NSG and an
Army Officer not heading the NSG.
Early morning
(3.30 am): Terrorists spotted; Centre claims they were contained in forested
area
Evening: Four
terrorists killed; Home Minister claims operations over
Who briefed
Home Minister, and why was haste shown in declaring operation a success?
Even the Prime
Minister declared operations were over.
January 3
(Sunday)
Morning (10
am): NSG's Lt Col Niranjan killed, five others injured while inspecting a
terrorist's body.
Why was no
protocol in place to avoid such casualties? Obviously the NSG Commandoes were
not trained to handle dead terrorist bodies. The body of the terrorist was
booby trapped by his accomplice after his death. It is learnt that a grenade
with safety pin removed was kept under his body as soon as the body was moved
the lever flew out detonating the grenade and Killing the colonel, though he
was a bomb disposal expert not trained to deal with terrorists. An army man
from a nearby Army Unit would not have probably made this mistake. However Mr.
NSA did not find it necessary to hand over Command to the local Army Commander
with over 50,000 well trained and Anti Terrorist and counter insurgency experienced
troops under his Command. Why Why Why?
12.20 pm: Firing starts from two different locations, security forces realize more terrorists are alive
Why was there
no careful combing and clearing of the area? Obviously 300 NSG personnel and a
column of Army soldiers cannot comb an area of more than 1500 acres. Why was
the local units not deployed Mr. NSA why?
All this happened near
one of the most heavily guarded international borders in the world. Not in a
far away place not used to terror attacks.
Yet, the
response was extremely poor and embarrassing.
The Pakistan
backed Jaish-e-Mohammed terrorists easily gained access into a vital Indian Air
Force Station at Pathankot. They managed to cause the intended damage and
instill fear across India.
The
inefficient handling of the operation cost us the lives of seven soldiers and
also damaged the reputation of our elite security forces.
After
Saturday's operations, the Centre even declared that the entire operation was
over and all the terrorists have been killed. On Sunday, the firing once again
began causing fear and embarrassment at the same time. Two terrorists actually
stayed inside the IAF Station undetected the entire Saturday night.
What a
national embarrassment!!
After the SP
reported that his vehicle was hijacked by suspected terrorists, the police and
other agencies should have heightened security across all vital installations
near the border. If they had done that, they could have stopped the terrorists
outside or at least at the gates of the Pathankot IAF Station. It clearly shows
that despite tall claims of "high alert" nothing was actually done on
the ground and authorities were actually groping in the dark.
Any well
trained and professional military force would definitely have stopped these
terrorists at the gate. Provided they were handed over operations to begin
with.
Local media
reports suggest that the Punjab Police and other security agencies initially
refused to take the words of the abducted SP seriously. They wasted a lot of
precious time. Even the murder of a taxi driver did not force them to launch a
massive manhunt.
These
incidents were treated like ordinary crimes and not like a possible terror
attack.
Where were
the terrorists hiding between the night of January 1 and January 2? What were
they doing? We are yet to get the answer to these questions.
It exposes
the lapse on part of Punjab Police too. Like most other states, Punjab Police
is also highly politicized and morale is also not high.
The NSA and the PMO must explain what went wrong to the nation. Prime Minister Narendra
Modi and the Defence Minister Manohar Parrikar must take stock of the situation
and order strict action against erring officers. The NSA must be removed
immediately and an Army Man must be appointed in his place. No
saying what this gentleman will fuck up next.
After
watching the botched up Pathankot security operations, the masters of the
terrorists in Pakistan must be smiling. This is exactly what they wanted.
The Pathankot
incident should be treated like a national embarrassment. There is nothing to
claim that India successfully "averted" a major disaster, something
like the 26/11 incident of Mumbai.
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