A policeman finally speaks...

Good Morning India...

Quoted from the article by Abhinav Kumar IPS, attached below.

Firstly : Quote" lieutenant General (retired) MS. Panag, writing in The Indian Express ('Pathankot attack: A terror strike, some hard truths', January 11), has based his criticism of the Pathankot operation on half truths, skilfully blended with outright speculation and typical Fauji bluster. It is entirely in line with recent trends by retired army officers to bull-doze public opinion on any issue, including Orop," Unquote

Well Well so this IPS Officer who is sitting as DIG (proc) in ITBP is reposed with all the truths and actual happenings of this operation, to make such sweeping allegations/statements, spiced with terms like "bulldoze public opinion" , "Fauzi Bluster" and others. Yet I am happy that an IPS Officer has shown some OO to speak up. I think he is mature enough to understand the reasons why Serving as well as retired soldiers do not see the police in kind light. A telling article which otherwise could have been a serious piece to ponder, has lost its sheen by his personal comments like "Fauzi Bluster" and frivolous and baseless allegations and conclusions on the Generals of the Indian Army. etc.

Secondly :Quote "Former officers, 
both serving and retired", to question the wisdom of deploying the NSG in the Pathankot operation is institutional cussedness and myopia of the worst kind." Unquote.

Let me light up his knowledge first. Serving Officers are not former officers. Again there was no need to brand us serving and retired Officers as " mean spirited disagreeable contrary people who are unwilling to be helpful, and do things that are annoying". Institutional cussedness means just that in case he is not aware. Further by referring to us as "Myopic" he describes us as unimaginative, non creative, unadventurous, narrow-minded, lacking intellectual and other types of foresight, small-minded, short-termed, insular, parochial and provincial people. Well well well. Criticism by a retired Army Officer of his brethren Mr NSA, it appears, has brought out such a venomous, harsh and angry response Or to put it correctly as "Venomous and Vituperative Response".

Thirdly Quote :"The Airbase Commander and his superiors in the Indian Air Force and in the Government of India made an error of judgement in not relying on local army assets and calling for the National Security Guard (NSG) instead. Dealing with the second issue first, according to Panag, placing armed forces troops under the command of the NSG has an "adverse effect on morale". I guess concern for the morale of the army, as defined by its retired generals, should take precedence over the security of our national assets and the safety of our citizens. " Unquote.

Here I think Mr. IPS due to his "Myopia" has totally misread what the retired General actually meant about morale. I guess the General was concerned about the morale of the soldiers who were engaging terrorists at that point of time on ground. Officers included. It is in the sense that a civilian had become their commander in field, which is anathema as far as The Indian Army is concerned. I am sure the retired General did not mean "Morale building in long term as vituperatively decoded and brought out by the writer. Though the IG ops NSG, is a Maj Gen of the Indian Army, there are civilians in the line of command.

Further coming to the first point in quote 3 which the writer has scornfully brought out. "The Airbase Commander and his superiors in the Indian Air Force and in the Government of India made an error of judgement in not relying on local army assets and calling for the National Security Guard (NSG) instead." 

I question him : "Why no detailed combing of the region done, despite several military units with a manpower of nearly 50,000 troops all trained and experienced in counter insurgency and terrorist warfare stationed next door, not deployed at Air Base Immediately?" Why did people concerned take a decision to send the NSG by road and or Air before deploying local troops who knew the area and familiar with these kind of operations? Doe he not think in the interests of safety of the Air Base and Pathankot per say this first action would be more appropriate followed by action two?

Well referring to the last para in the article : I would comment.

Well yes perceptions differ. If one looks at it from the point of view " It was a brilliant op, because they were not allowed to get away, and after contact was established achieved practically zilch". Then yes it was a brilliant op. How ever if one looks at it from a holistic point of view militarily, tactically and strategically, then it was certainly a shambles. I am not trying to put or create a template of anti terror ops, of which I have had my fill during service. Yet a broad template is always there for such kind of operations and that cannot be denied. However what troubles is that instead of a surgeons knife, going in and coming out clean, we saw a hotch poch of C3I (Command Control Communication and Intelligence). 

To give a very simple analogy may not be appropriate but here goes. A good cook when he makes dinner with an exotic menu having a 100 plus different ingredients, the end result is fantastic yet his kitchen remains well ordered, neat and clean and he himself ready to in terms of energy and spirit to cook another exotic meal without resting. So that is his template. A bad cook will make the same exotic menu, fantastic to eat, yet you will find his cook house in a total mess with all the wet and dry garbage of chopped veggies, meats, parts of fish and fish bones and chicken entrails and plastic bags lying all about him and he in a totally exhausted condition. That was the state of C3I as far as this operation was concerned. I think if I have expressed my feelings correctly sir, then this is the difference between a good and a bad op.

Fourthly : Quote "Also, as the successful experience of Punjab militancy and anti-Naxal operations suggest there is no substitute for a well-equipped and well-motivated police force in tackling both counter-insurgency and individual terror operations. The contrasting experiences of Operation Bluestar and Operation Black Thunder are a case in point The gung ho military approach often may be a cure worse than the disease." Unquote.

WoW Mr. Policeman then why dont you take on all Counter insurgency operations from the Army and let us train and prepare ourselves for the job we are supposed to do!!!. About Punjab militancy I was posted at Taran taran as my brigade Signals Officer so all what he says is bull crap. Police did fuck all, they came with us because those were the orders. It was the Army let there be no doubt about it .Also included were medical camps run by us so also schools were started and farmers tilled their lands under our protection. Police were busy taking bribes and reportedly turning traitors by taking bribes from militants to escape our cordons through parts which were manned by police.

I am happy that the author has genuinely tried to express his concerns on quite valid points which he has brought out. However this article could have been more incisive, thought provoking in the readers specially, the Armed Forces if the writer had restricted himself to, relevant points, without coloring it with a kind of frivolous template born out of hatred and jealousy of the IPS towards the Armed forces, in my opinion that is.

Salût