I share below an article written by Mr M.G.Devasahayam a former Infantry Officer of the Indian Army. Mr. M.G.Devasahayam is an Economist cum Administrator with a
distinguished career spanning 40 years, with direct and first-hand experience in the
working and ethos of Indian Army, Civil Services, Government, Public & Private
Sector, Political system as well as NGOs.
Post-graduate in Economics from Loyola College, Madras. Taught Economics there fora year. Commissioned in the Indian Army (Infantry, The Madras Regiment) in
1964.
During Army service he had the distinction of participating in the
Indo-Pak War
[1965], anti-insurgency operations in Nagaland and Aid to Civil
Power in Assam and
Madras State (now Tamil Nadu). He is the recipient of
General Service Medal, Samar
Seva [War Service] Star and Special Service
[Nagaland] Medal.
After an honorable discharge, joined the IAS cadre. He retired from the IAS after an awesome career. It is rare that I share articles on
my blog yet I do so when I find these to be very readable and go to the core of
the subject.
Please read on....................
The Pathankot debacle
has triggered serious debate on India’s national security system, which is a
collective term for the defense and foreign relations of a country. As a
concept a government, along with its parliament, should protect the state and
its citizens against all kind of ‘national’ crises through a variety of power
projections, such as political clout, diplomacy, economic strength, military
might etc. India does not have a national security architecture that addresses
these basics. Everything is ad hoc depending on personal whims and fancies.
That is why the incumbent National Security Adviser (NSA) is facing stringent
criticism on the Pathankot episode. It could as well turn out to be a blessing
in disguise if out of this morass something good emerges.
This ‘good’ should be
in the form of a national security doctrine and strategy. Latter flows from the
former, both are inter-related but not interchangeable. Doctrine is a set of
national principles, indeed ‘a statement of Government policy.’ Political
Doctrine is “fundamental Government policy especially in international
relations.” A country’s national security policy is determined by many factors,
including external threats, geography, political culture, military capabilities,
economic needs, elite opinion, popular opinion (in democracies) and its
leaders’ perceptions of the country’s interests. This conceptual framework
manifests itself as foreign policy or national security ‘doctrine’, which in
turn guides leaders in conducting the foreign policy of a country. At its most
effective, a national security doctrine is the organizing principle that helps
statesmen identify and prioritize that country’s geopolitical interests.
India has no such
‘doctrine’. It is only the Army that has one and it is anchored on Kautilya’s
words of wisdom: “There can be four dangers to a state; That which is of
external origin and of internal abetment; That which is of internal origin and
of external abetment; That which is of external origin and of external
abetment; and that which is of internal origin and of internal abetment”.
Accordingly Army Doctrine-2004 defines its role in national security. Primary
role is to preserve national interests and safeguard sovereignty, territorial
integrity and unity of India against any external threats by deterrence or by
waging war. Secondary role is to assist Government agencies to cope with ‘proxy
war’ and other internal threats and provide aid to civil authority when
requisitioned for the purpose.
To perform this role
Army has a command and control structure with the President of India as the
Supreme Commander. As in all democracies, Indian Army is controlled by the
elected political leadership of the nation (Government of India). Executive
control is exercised sequentially through the Union Cabinet, the Defense
Minister and the Chief of Army Staff (COAS). Ministry of Defense handles
matters related to personnel, financial and resource management.
At the national level
there is no such structure. We have Ministries of Home (MHA) and External
Affairs (MEA) responsible for internal security and foreign affairs
respectively. But we have no geopolitical-based foreign policy or national
security doctrine/system. From independence till the late nineties some
hard-nosed intelligence sleuths have functioned as principal security advisors
to the prime ministers.
In 1998, during the
prime minister-ship of Atal Behari Vajpayee, the post of National Security
Adviser (NSA) was created. Brajesh Mishra of the Indian Foreign Service was the
first person to occupy this post with additional charge of Principal Secretary
to PM. After him JN Dixit of the IFS was NSA for a brief period. He breathed
his last and was succeeded by MK Narayanan of the Indian Police Service. He
brought in Shiv Shankar Menon of the IFS to take his place. Now we have Ajit
Doval of the IPS as NSA running the PMO where all powers are concentrated, with
the MHA and MEA playing second fiddle!
Over these years our
diplomacy has stumbled and India has ended up alienating all its neighbors and
antagonizing some like Nepal and Sri Lanka. With the Armed Forces being meddled
with and marginalized our national security is in disarray. NSA is the product
of the spoils system and not part of the institutional structure of governance.
In the US where the spoils system prevails in the upper echelons of government,
the NSA post fits in. But not in India where governance is a combination of
elected leaders and professional civil servants and the armed forces. Besides
we have a fairly well structured Foreign Service and persons of outstanding
merit can be laterally inducted if need be.
The rationale offered
for the position of NSA was that (a) a nuclear power needed a professional
adviser who would synthesize intelligence inputs and advise the PM and (b) the
proliferating intelligence agencies needed a coordinating head who would
provide inputs to PM on a continuous basis. Since NSAs have a critical position
and enjoy complete confidence of the prime minister, they tend to acquire a
great deal of informal authority. This is at the cost of institutional heads,
particularly the foreign, defence and home ministers and cabinet secretary.
The NSA office is not
backed by any legislative provisions nor has parliamentary accountability. So there
is a lot of power being exercised by this office without any responsibility.
Our system does not provide for any formal forum in which the NSA can express
his opinion and which can be challenged by the civil service institutions. Thus
his views do not appear in any file which can be the subject of Parliamentary
scrutiny. It is only the Ministers and Secretaries who remain responsible and
answerable to Parliament either in Committees (Secretaries) or the House
(Ministers). Because of this structural defect and the concomitant decline of
formal arrangements like the Crisis Management Group the system can never
deliver results and will always create unforeseen problems. This is precisely
what happened in Pathankot.
Under such chaos
national security has become a sort of plaything for the Delhi Durbar
comprising of vested interests from across political and business spectrum
enjoying great camaraderie. This is evident from the sudden sound-byte from the
Congress busybody Manish Tiwari, a former Union Minister in the midst of the
pathetic Pathankot episode. He was testifying the obnoxious Indian Express news
story on April 4, 2012 alleging attempted coup by the Indian Army then headed
by General VK Singh who is now a Union Minister in the Modi Cabinet. Says Tiwari:
"At that time, I used to serve in the Standing Committee of Defence. And
it's unfortunate, but the story was true. The story was correct." Tiwari’s
objective seems to be to dent the credibility of the Indian Army at this
critical time and undermine its role in ensuring the nation’s security.
A brief recap. Within
days of his assuming the office of Army Chief in 2010, the Durbar started
hounding General Singh, who was not part of their preferred ‘line of
succession’, for disturbing their cozy relationship with the arms, drugs and
other lobbies. The concocted coup story was the first major open salvo to
discredit the office of the Army Chief and belittle the Indian Army as an
institution. By linking the Hissar (Haryana) troop movement to the 1984 perceived
‘mutiny’ of some Sikh units in the wake of Operation Bluestar, Shekhar Gupta
was suggesting that General Singh was doing the same because of his grievance
on the Date of Birth issue. This is a clear case of abetting mutiny punishable
under Section 131 Indian Penal Code. This act being prejudicial to the defence
of India and the security of the State also attracts Sections 3 (1) and (2) of
the National Security Act 1980. Crime of sedition under Section 124A of IPC
could also be applicable. Nothing of that sort happened because those pulling
the strings were celebrities running the state by proxy!
Then there was this
concoction on Technical Service Division (TSD) which was a covert operation
agency set-up by General Singh, with activities directly related to the safety
of the soldiers fighting on the borders, retribution on the enemy and the
security of the citizens. By its very nature TSD operation was ‘top secret’. In
that event, even the existence of TSD should never have been publicized.
Further, if there is exposure of the actual working of the top-secret unit,
leaking information about it could be treacherous, regardless of whether
information is true or not. Yet this is what the media persons affiliated to
the Delhi Durbar did with impunity only to hound General Singh.
Earlier, in March,
2012, someone in the UPA Government deliberately leaked out a top-secret letter
from the Army Chief to the Prime Minister about the woeful deficiency in
defense preparedness. Though the leakage was traced to an official in the
Cabinet Secretariat this serious act of treason has gone unpunished.
As can be seen, the
above shenanigans of the ‘Delhi Durbar’ have serious criminal content impacting
the effectiveness of the Armed Forces in protecting citizens and safeguarding the
nation’s security. Sensing the gravity of the matter General VK Singh lodged a
formal complaint with the MHA in November/December 2013 categorically stating
that these serious offences have been committed due to abetment and conspiracy
indulged in by vested interests with corrupt intentions. According to him only
thorough investigation would bring out the truth about who these persons are
and what is their motive for indulging in activities aimed at destabilizing
India and endangering its sovereignty.
Nothing has been done
in the last over two years, even 18 months into the BJP led NDA regime which is
supposed to be nationalistic and patriotic. Corruption, perfidy and treason are
the worst forms of threat to national security that have caused countries and
governments to crumble and fall asunder. When these go hand-in-hand it is the
deadliest of combinations that could destroy any nation or people. Such combine
has been in place in India for long with the blessings of the powers-that-be.
Pathankot, which is a mix of corruption, perfidy and treachery, is proof
enough.
Be that as it may, the immediate requirement is to put together
a National Security Doctrine that should have political consensus, publicly
transparent and should reflect the complex challenges facing the country. The
doctrine must be accompanied by a national security strategy that spells out
the command and control structures for meeting eventualities such as terror
strikes, so that Pathankot-like situation never happens again. Such a strategy
should be in tune with the Army Doctrine and the role of Armed Forces which is
the last bastion for safeguarding the nation’s security, sovereignty and
integrity. MEA also should play its rightful role in shaping a foreign policy
based on India’s geopolitical concerns. These are the basics that need to be
addressed without any further loss of time.
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